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BOX 1.1THE RECENT MODERATION IN INFLATION: OUTLOOK AND RISKS
Inflation slowed markedly in 2013 both in Spain and in the euro 
area as a whole, with the respective year-on-year changes in the 
HICP in December standing at 0.3% and 0.8%. This trajectory has 
continued in 2014 to date. Projections by private analysts, official 
agencies and those implicit in financial market prices assume 
inflation will hold at very low levels for a prolonged period (see 
accompanying table 1). Specifically, for the euro area as a whole, 
the projections available point to a very slow return to rates close 
to 2% and to a negative Spain/euro area differential. However, 
longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored at levels 
slightly below the 2% reference (see Panel 1). 
The recent downward course of inflation is due to the 
disappearance of certain temporary factors, linked to fiscal 
consolidation, and to the trend of energy prices and the exchange 
rate, although factors of a more permanent nature are also in play. 
The latter include most notably the moderation of unit labour costs 
and significant excess slack. The influence of these factors has 
been greater in Spain than in the euro area as a whole, owing to 
the adjustment under way here to regain the competitiveness lost 
during the expansionary phase.
Against this background of very low inflation, analysis of the 
scenarios in which price declines and, ultimately, deflationary 
processes – with across-the-board and sustained falls in prices – 
might arise has become important. In this respect, the diffusion 
indicators show that price declines are not overly widespread either 
in Spain or the euro area (see Panel 2)1, though they have increased 
in 2013, albeit without yet reaching the highs observed in late 2009 
and early 2010. Unlike that period, however, the recent slowdown in 
prices is proving especially significant in the case of services prices 
which, as they are particularly labour-intensive, have been more 
affected by wage moderation and productivity gains. 
In any event, when evaluating scenarios of sustained price 
declines a distinction must be drawn between the consequences 
for the euro area as a whole and for Spain. A fall in a euro area 
member country’s prices might reflect the adjustment of relative 
prices needed to correct some of its imbalances. In that respect, 
Spain 2014 2015 2016
    Consensus Forecast (April 2014) 0.3 1.0 1.5
    European Commission (February 2014) 0.3 0.9 —
    IMF (April 2014) 0.3 0.8 0.9
Euro Area
    ECB (March 2014) 1.0 1.3 1.5
    Consensus Forecast (April 2014) 0.9 1.3 1.5
    European Commission (February 2014) 1.0 1.3 —
    IMF (April 2014) 0.9 1.2 1.3
    Inkation swap contracts (24 April 2014) 1.0 1.2 1.4
1  INFLATION FORECASTS 
SOURCES: Eurostat.
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1  These indicators measure the proportion of expenditure-weighted and 
seasonally adjusted HICP items that show month-on-month declines.
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shocks originating in positive developments on the supply side 
entail benign price declines, as they are accompanied by higher 
levels of output and employment. Notable among these are 
those linked to structural reforms that improve the economy’s 
productivity or heighten competition in product and factor 
markets.2 Conversely, contractionary demand-side shocks may 
be more harmful, bringing together declines in prices and output 
which, if they feed back into one another, may prompt a 
deflationary spiral. 
A generalised and persistent situation of price declines may 
dampen activity through various channels. Firstly, expectations of 
sustained low inflation exerts upward pressure on the expected 
real interest rate, which leads to private spending being deferred. 
Moreover, if – as is currently the case – nominal interest rates are 
close to zero, the capacity of conventional monetary policy to 
correct this effect is very limited. Secondly, as debt contacts are 
specified in nominal terms, falls in prices increase the real-terms 
cost of servicing such debt. That is particularly significant in 
countries such as Spain, where the volume of household and 
corporate debt is still high. Lastly, and more generally, very low 
inflation across the euro area hampers an individual country 
achieving gains in competitiveness relative to the area as a whole.
In any event, a very moderate inflation scenario may trigger particularly 
adverse effects if it unanchors long-term inflation expectations, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy and increasing 
real interest rates. Nonetheless, at present European households do 
not seem to expect either that consumer prices will fall (see Panel 3) 
or that long-term inflation expectations will be far off 2%. 
The Banco de España dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model BEMOD, estimated for Spain and the rest of the euro area, 
provides for the analysis of the probability of different price 
scenarios materialising in relation to Eurosystem predictions. In 
particular, an assessment can be made of the probability with 
which moderate inflation (lower than 1% on average in 2014) or 
price falls of some intensity (a rate of change below -1%) might be 
observed.3 The estimations show that scenarios of inflation below 
1% are highly likely, especially in Spain, while the scenarios of price 
declines of over 1% are fairly unlikely. In addition, to assess the 
extent to which a slightly higher level of inflation across the euro 
area may smooth the competitive adjustment needed in Spain, an 
alternative exercise has been conducted. In it, as the result of a 
more expansionary monetary policy, inflation in the euro area 
increases by 50 bp in 2014 and 2015, drawing closer to the 2% 
target in late 2015. Under this new scenario, there is an appreciably 
lower probability that Spanish inflation will be below -1%.
In short, the evidence available would indicate that inflation is 
going to remain at very low levels over a prolonged period, but that 
the probability of a costly deflation process arising at present is 
limited. In any event, the adjustment still required in terms of 
competitiveness in some economies in the area, such as Spain’s, 
would be assisted if the euro area inflation rate were to converge 
towards its long-term target at a somewhat brisker rate pace than 
is currently anticipated. 
BOX 1.1THE RECENT MODERATION IN INFLATION: OUTLOOK AND RISKS (cont’d)
2  See J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), Structural reforms in a 
debt overhang, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España 
(forthcoming), and Box 1.2 in this Chapter.
3  In interpreting the results it should be borne in mind that the simulations 
performed incorporate the zero lower bound constraint whereby nominal 
interest rates cannot be negative, although they do not consider the 
possibility of implementing non-conventional monetary policy measures. 
In addition, the exercises presented hereafter do not take into account 
the debt deflation channel, meaning that the total cost of the generalised 
and sustained declines in prices might be being underestimated. Lastly, 
bootstrapping techniques are used to take into account the dependence 
of the structural shocks.
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Commission.
a Calculated with seasonally adjusted series.
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BOX 1.2THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH DEBT
In the current setting, there is scant headroom to boost 
aggregate demand by means of conventional monetary policy 
(interest rate cuts) and fiscal policy (countercyclical balances) 
instruments. Accordingly, one of the main economic policy 
options for reinvigorating activity is the application of structural 
reforms that make product and factor markets more efficient 
and competitive. 
In the long run, there are few doubts over the positive effects of 
these reforms: insofar as a market becomes more competitive, 
the volume of activity grows, prices fall and the opportunities for 
improving economic agents’ welfare increase. Through the 
expectations of the latter, who discount a greater future spending 
capacity, a portion of the durable benefits of the reforms normally 
materialise in the short run (the expectations channel). However, 
the moderation in prices typically prompted by structural reforms 
may give rise to increases in real interest rates and, therefore, to 
declines in household and corporate spending in the short run 
(the interest rate channel). Moreover, given debt whose nominal 
amount is predetermined, a moderation in prices prompts a 
higher real value of debt (the “Fisher effect” or the debt deflation 
channel1), with the subsequent restrictive effect on debtor 
agents’ budgets. 
The relative intensity of the foregoing channels – expectations, 
on one hand, and the interest rate and debt deflation, on the 
other – determines the sign of the short-term impact of the 
structural reforms. Some recent research has emphasised the 
fact that the lack of headroom to make nominal interest rate cuts 
may be pivotal in inclining the balance in favour of contractionary 
channels.2 This type of analysis would appear to point to the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a All variables expressed as deviations from their initial state, except private-sector debt/GDP, which is in percentage points.
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1  See I. Fisher (1933), “The debt-deflation theory of great depressions», 
Econometrica vol. 1, pp. 337-357.
2  See, for example, G. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero and A. Raffo (2014), “Can 
structural reforms help Europe?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
61, pp. 2-22.
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BOX  1.2THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH DEBT (cont’d)
advisability of postponing the reforms until their contractionary 
effects may be countered by expansionary macroeconomic 
policies.3
Nonetheless, most of the macroeconomic models used in the 
foregoing research are designed to analyse the fluctuations proper 
to a traditional economic cycle, rather than those arising from a 
deep-seated macrofinancial crisis such as the present one. In a 
recent paper, Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2014)4 develop a specially 
designed model to analyse the effect of structural reforms on an 
environment similar to that currently characterising the Spanish 
economy, namely one of slow leverage, owing to the presence of 
a high volume of long-dated debt, and of restricted access to 
financing.  Further, the model considers that the domestic 
economy is part of a monetary union that has no leeway to lower 
interest rates. Businesses and a portion of households take on 
debt using the value of their real estate assets as collateral; 
however, when the value of their assets falls below a specific 
threshold, the extension of fresh credit is interrupted and, in that 
case, debtors restrict themselves to repaying their outstanding 
debt according to the maturities stipulated in their debt contracts. 
The starting point is a baseline scenario that includes a persistent 
tightening of loan access conditions for households and firms, and 
that entails, in particular, a reduction in the loan-to-value ratios of 
the new loans granted to these agents. The blue lines in Panel 1 
show the response of the economy to this financial shock (the 
magnitudes of the simulations are merely illustrative of the 
qualitative behaviour of the model and should not be interpreted as 
realistic quantitative approximations). The slump in real estate 
prices and, therefore, in the value of the collateral means the flow 
of new credit shrinks sharply, which gives rise to a long and slow 
process of private deleveraging. The need for households and 
firms to generate saving to repay their debts and clean up their 
balance sheets leads them to reduce consumption and investment 
levels. In parallel, the trade balance improves thanks to the gains in 
competitiveness to which the disinflationary effect of the shock and 
the subsequent contraction in domestic demand gives rise. Yet this 
improvement does not suffice to prevent a prolonged decline in 
GDP. When the value of the assets of the households and firms 
applying for funds reaches the minimum threshold for satisfying 
loan access conditions, the flow of fresh credit re-starts. Thereafter, 
a virtuous circle takes hold, with a vigorous pick-up in asset prices, 
in credit and in agents’ spending capacity. As a result, consumption 
and investment, and GDP too, begin to recover. 
The unbroken red lines in Panel 1 show the responses of the main 
variables when structural reforms are adopted that involve 
increases in the degree of competition in the product and labour 
markets. These reforms induce a lasting reduction in business 
mark-ups and give rise to more moderate wages.5 In the long run, 
these measures have a clearly positive effect on GDP and 
employment; but they also relieve the adverse effects of 
deleveraging in the short and medium term. This is chiefly due to 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The panels show the differential effect of the structural reforms on GDP, i.e. the difference between the two lines in the top-left hand graphic in Panel 1, for different 
values of the elasticities of exports and imports to relative prices.
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3  Some theoretical developments pointing along these lines can be found 
in the following papers: G. Eggertsson, G. (2012), “Was the New Deal 
contractionary?”, American Economic Review, vol. 102, pp. 524-555; G. 
Eggertsson, and P. Krugman (2012), “Debt, deleveraging, and the 
liquidity trap: a Fisher-Minsky-Koo approach”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 127, pp. 1469-1513; and J. Galí, and T. Monacelli 
(2014), “Understanding the gains from wage flexibility: The exchange 
rate connection”, CEPR discussion paper 9806.
4  See J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), “Structural reforms in a debt 
overhang”, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España (forthcoming).
5  Specifically, there is a reduction in price mark-ups (i.e. the difference 
between production prices and marginal production costs) and wage 
mark-ups (that between wages paid to workers and their reserve wages). 
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the better performance of investment. Specifically, anticipation of 
the beneficial effects of the reforms in the long run means that, in 
the short run already, households and firms increase their 
investment demand relative to the baseline scenario. This greater 
demand entails a lesser decline in real estate asset prices. That 
contributes to curtailing the severity of the decline in debtors’ 
financial worth and, therefore, helps them regain earlier the 
minimum threshold at which new credit may be granted. 
Combining with this positive effect on firms’ financial capacity is a 
contraction in these agents’ consumption which, in the context of 
this model, may be assimilated to smaller dividend payouts (and, 
therefore, a greater accumulation of retained earnings). 
In this way, the reforms bring forward the end of the deleveraging 
process and, therefore, of the recession, thus reinforcing the 
expectations channel. At the same time, since the flow of new credit 
slows substantially during the deleveraging phase, private spending 
decisions at the aggregate level are relatively insensitive to the 
increase in the real interest rate induced by the deflationary effect of 
the reforms. This leads to a loss of intensity in the interest rate 
channel. The combination of both effects – the reinforcement of the 
expectations channel and the weakening of the interest rate channel 
– results in a net positive effect of the reforms on activity and 
employment in the short run already, which prevails over the negative 
Fisher effect arising from a path of lower prices. In this respect, the 
presence of a high proportion of long-term debt – which is an 
essential factor in the current crisis, especially in the case of 
household mortgage debt – operates by substantially cushioning the 
short-term contractionary effect of the debt deflation channel.
One significant channel for the transmission of the effects of the 
reforms is that of foreign trade. As can be seen in Panel 1, the 
reforms do not bring about a significant effect on the trade balance 
in the short term. This apparent lack of effect encompasses two 
opposing forces: although the reforms bring about an additional 
lowering of the prices of domestic products, they also prompt an 
improvement in domestic demand. This behaviour of the external 
balance depends largely on the sensitivity of trade flows to the 
relative prices of domestic and foreign goods. The left-hand 
graphic of Panel 2 shows the differential effect of the reforms on 
GDP6 for two different calibrations of the elasticity of exports to 
relative prices: unit elasticity (the baseline value7), and a very low 
elasticity of 0.2. In this latter case, the effects of the reforms in the 
short run turn negative, owing to the insufficient positive 
contribution of exports. In the case of imports (right-hand graphic), 
reducing their price-elasticity also reduces the positive effect of 
the reforms, though not to the extent of changing the sign of this 
effect. This example illustrates, therefore, that a key condition if 
the reforms are to have beneficial effects in the short term is that 
the resulting gain in competitiveness should pass through with 
sufficient intensity to trade flows. 
BOX 1.2THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH DEBT (cont’d)
6  The differential effect of the reforms on GD Pis equivalent to the vertical 
distance between the two lines in the upper left-hand graphic of Panel 1.
7  The calibration of the unit elasticity of exports is based on estimates for 
Spain by C. García, E. Gordo, J. Martínez-Martín and P. Tello (2009), “Una 
actualización de las funciones de exportación e importación de la economía 
española”, Documentos Ocasionales, no. 0905, Banco de España.
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The unemployment rate in the Spanish economy peaked in 2013 
Q1 (at 26.9% of the labour force), marking an increase of close to 
20 pp on the low recorded in 2007 Q3. Since then, unemployment 
has moved on a progressively declining path, dipping to 25.9% in 
2014 Q1. The latest macroeconomic projections of the Banco de 
España, released in March, point to the continuation of this 
trajectory over the remainder of 2014 and in 2015 in a setting in 
which the gradual recovery in activity is forecast to pass through 
intensely to job creation, assisted by ongoing wage moderation 
and its extension over the projection horizon. Notwithstanding, the 
unemployment rate in the Spanish economy is expected to hold at 
very high levels in comparative terms. 
There are different reasons why an initially cyclical increase in 
unemployment may become persistent, generating an increase in 
the structural component of unemployment through what is 
usually known as a hysteresis effect that hampers subsequent 
reductions in the unemployment rate, even in an economic upturn. 
Such hysteresis can be caused by various factors. Thus, enduring 
unemployment status over a prolonged period may ultimately 
exert permanent effects on the human capital of the unemployed, 
on their intensity of job search and on firms’ perception of their 
skills or background. These effects may be more significant in a 
context of sectoral reallocation of employment in which the skills 
demanded by firms differ from what the unemployed have to offer. 
One way of analysing the degree of persistence of unemployment 
consists of estimating the structural rate of joblessness, a concept 
that can be interpreted as the unemployment rate of the economy 
in the medium term, once the impact of cyclical factors is stripped 
BOX 1.3AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT
SOURCES: EPA (INE) microdata and Banco de España.
a Percentage of total unemployed.
b /DQBDMS@FDNETMDLOKNXDCVGNjMCVNQJHMSGDENKKNVHMFPT@QSDQ
c ,HRL@SBG ADSVDDM SGD CHRSQHATSHNM AX DCTB@SHNM@K @SS@HMLDMS KDUDK OQHL@QX RSTCHDR NQ KDRR jQRSOG@RD RDBNMC@QX RSTCHDR GHFGDQ RDBNMC@QX RSTCHDR
vocational training and university studies) of the employed and the unemployed. Having regard to the sectoral dimension, three major sectors of activity are 
TRDCL@MTE@BSTQHMFBNMRSQTBSHNM@MCRDQUHBDR@MCANSGSGDTMDLOKNXDCRDDJHMFSGDHQjQRSINA@MCSGDKNMFSDQLTMDLOKNXDCNMVGNLMNHMENQL@SHNM
on the sector of activity is available, are excluded.
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out. This structural component is, however, non-observable and 
estimating it is subject to high uncertainty as there are different 
methodological approaches that provide different results. 
Presented below are the results of the application of a methodology 
that involves estimating the disaggregation between the structural 
and cyclical components of unemployment using the Phillips 
curve approach.1 Specifically, a relationship is assumed between 
wage growth and deviations of unemployment from its structural 
component, i.e. the cyclical component of unemployment. Hence, 
if unemployment is below (above) its equilibrium or structural level, 
higher (lower) wage growth will tend to be observed, meaning that 
the structural unemployment rate, which under this approach is 
usually called the NAIRU, could be interpreted as that level of the 
rate that were compatible with stable inflation. 
The top left-hand hand graphic of Panel 1 shows the cumulative 
increase in the NAIRU since 2008 following the above-mentioned 
methodology. The high uncertainty constantly surrounding these 
estimates usually advises analysing medium-term trends rather 
than the discrete levels estimated.2 The results show that the 
Spanish economy’s structural unemployment rate would have 
increased by around 4 pp since the onset of the crisis.3 the 
estimates available for Spain by the OECD and the EC tend to 
offer a somewhat higher increase, with the NAIRU showing a more 
procyclical profile. 
This result would reflect the impact of hysteresis effects on the 
NAIRU. Thus, the average duration of unemployment episodes 
has risen from around 2.8 quarters to over 6.5 quarters in 2013, 
raising to 60.7% the proportion of the unemployed experiencing 
this status for more than a year. There has also been a most 
substantial increase in the percentage of those unemployed for a 
very long period, of over two years, to 38.9% of total unemployed 
(see the top right-hand graphic of Panel 1). This phenomenon is 
concentrated, moreover, in certain groups, such as employees 
over 50 years of age or the more unskilled unemployed, for which 
this percentage stood at around 50% at end-2013. 
Unemployment exit rates, which have fallen appreciably for all 
unemployment durations, have begun to rise slightly in 2013, at 
least for the unemployed with less duration in this situation (see 
the bottom left-hand graphic of Panel 1). Foreseeably, the incipient 
recovery will help entrench this improvement which, nonetheless, 
will probably be slower among the group with longer durations.4 
This diminished cyclicality of exits from unemployment once a 
large amount of time has been accumulated experiencing this 
status might limit the aggregate recovery of the unemployment 
exit rate in the face of a cyclical upturn. 
Unemployment persistence might also be related to the increase 
in the skills mismatch between labour supply and demand 
observed since the start of the crisis. In this connection, the 
bottom right-hand graphic of Panel 1 shows the changes in a 
skills mismatch index that seeks to measure the discrepancy 
between the breakdown by level of educational attainment of the 
employed and unemployed populations.5 In principle, it is 
expected that the bigger this mismatch is, the more difficult it will 
prove to reabsorb unemployment. The clear increase in the level 
of skills mismatch is observed during the crisis, caused by the 
concentration of job destruction among the lesser-skilled. If the 
sectoral dimension is taken into account, the pattern is similar 
and highlights how the acute job destruction in the construction 
industry, especially at the start of the crisis, prompted a 
considerable increase in the relative weight of the low-skilled 
unemployed. These results indicate that a reduction in 
unemployment will require the adaptation of unemployed 
workers’ skills to job requirements. 
In short, although a significant portion of the increase in 
unemployment since the start of the crisis is closely associated 
with the cyclical downturn, it cannot be ruled out that there has in 
parallel been an increase in the structural component of 
unemployment, which might hamper any reduction in 
unemployment in the near future. These difficulties appear to be 
particularly marked for specific groups, among whom very high 
unemployment durations are observed. The overall design of 
active and passive policies of support for the unemployed should 
focus on increasing the employability of these groups, analysing 
the links with the various social protection mechanisms and 
facilitating wage flexibility. 
BOX 1.3AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT (cont’d)
1  See J. Gali (2011), “The Return of the Wage Phillips Curve”, Journal of 
European Economic Association, June, 9 (3), pp. 436-461.
2  See, for example, Estrada, Hernando and López Salido (2000), 
Measuring the NAIRU in the Spanish Economy, Documentos de Trabajo, 
no. 0009, Banco de España; or ECB (2012), Euro Area Labour Markets 
and the Crisis, Occasional Paper no. 138.
3  This increase is also similar to that estimated by Doménech (2013), 
“Potential Growth and Structural Unemployment in Spain, EMU and the 
US”, BBVA Research, mimeo, using an alternative methodology drawing 
on Okun’s Law. 
4  In particular, an analysis of the likelihood of exiting unemployment 
conducted for the 2005-2013 period, drawing on microdata on EPA 
flows, shows that this likelihood increases by 2.1 pp given a 1% 
improvement in GDP for the short-term unemployed, while for the 
longer-term unemployed the impact of an improvement in activity is only 
1.3 pp.
5  In particular, the distribution of the employed and unemployed population 
is used following five levels of educational attainment drawn from 
Spanish Labour Force Survey data. For further details see M. Izquierdo, 
S. Puente and P. Font (2013), “Evolución del desajuste educativo entre 
la oferta y la demanda de trabajo en España”, Boletín Económico, June, 
Banco de España.
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Before the crisis, the debt of non-financial corporations increased 
very quickly. Afterwards, it has decreased slowly and progressively 
against a background characterised by a macroeconomic 
recession in which employment and productive investment have 
deteriorated notably. This Box analyses to what extent the 
employment and tangible fixed-asset investment behaviour of 
non-financial corporations differs depending on their level of debt. 
To do this, use if made of the merged CBSO and Mercantile 
Register database (CBI)1, which contains microeconomic data 
from a sample of around 600,000 firms per year, for the period 
from 2008 to 2012 (latest year available). The firms are separated 
into two groups according to whether at the beginning of each 
year their ratio of debt to net assets is above or below the average 
for their industry.
Chart 1 shows the financial debt of the two groups of companies. 
It can be seen that, whereas the most indebted firms progressively 
reduced their borrowed funds from 2008, the debt of other firms 
followed an upward path until 2010 and then remained steady for 
the following two years. A more detailed analysis by industry and 
firm size confirms the existence of similar behaviour patterns in all 
industries, and in both SMEs and larger firms. As a result of this 
behaviour the ratio of debt to net assets of both aggregates 
became slightly more similar (see Chart 2). This convergence is 
more evident if construction is excluded, since this industry’s debt 
ratio was pushed upward by the high losses in the period analysed, 
which reduced the denominator of this indicator.
Charts 3 and 4 show investment in tangible fixed assets (measured 
as the ratio of the flow of gross fixed capital formation to its 
balance a year earlier) and unemployment for each of the two 
groups of firms analysed (more indebted and less indebted). Both 
aggregates show declining investment and job destruction, but 
the falls are sharper for more indebted firms. This pattern is 
observed in all industries, in both SMEs and large firms.
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eWpense. 
1  This database is obtained by merging the CBA and CBB databases. The 
CBA database contains information on some 10,000 firms reporting 
annually to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office and is somewhat 
biased towards larger firms. The CBB database is constructed from 
financial statements lodged by firms in the mercantile registers and 
contains information on small and medium-sized enterprises.
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In short, the results reported in this Box indicate that the level of 
firms’ indebtedness influenced their investment and employment 
decisions during the crisis. In particular, more indebted firms were 
comparatively more strongly affected by the crisis, since they 
were more vulnerable to the contraction of their income. That 
obliged them to adjust their balance sheet and to reduce 
employment and investment more sharply compared with 
financially sounder firms.
BOX 2.1EFFECT OF INDEBTEDNESS ON EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS (cont’d)
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Corporate insolvency proceedings are a legal proceeding which 
aims to address the situation of a borrower’s insolvency either 
through an agreement (accord) between the creditors and the 
debtor firm or through the winding-up of the latter. In the first case, 
a reduction in the nominal value of the debt is agreed (partial 
acquittance) and/or in the schedule of payments (payment period). 
In the second case, the creditors are paid by selling the company’s 
assets in accordance with the legally stipulated order of priority of 
creditors. These proceedings exist in all developed countries and 
most emerging economies. In Spain, they are currently governed 
by the Insolvency Law,1 which was approved in 2003 and came 
into force on 1 September 2004. The economic crisis underlined 
some of the shortfalls in the Law and, consequently, it has been 
subject to four major reforms through Royal Decree-Law 3/2009,2 
Law 38/2011,3 the Entrepreneurs’ Law4 and Royal Decree-Law 
4/20145.
The main function of insolvency proceedings is to overcome 
problems of coordination and asymmetrical information which 
make it difficult to renegotiate debt privately and for debts to be 
recovered individually and may lead to suboptimal results for 
lenders and borrowers. Coordination problems arise where there 
is a high number of creditors with diverging interests, whereas the 
asymmetrical information problems are particularly important in 
the case of small creditors, with little information and a short 
commercial relationship with the debtor, and in the case of small 
borrowers. Individual recoveries of the debts of a firm whose 
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Sources: M. Celentani, M. García-Posada and F. Gómez (2010), "The Spanish Business Bankruptcy Puzzle and the Crisis", Working Paper 2010-2011, FEDEA; 
Consejo General del Poder Judicial and E. van Hemmen (2013 and subsequent years ), "Estadística concursal. Anuario 2012", Colegio de Registradores de la 
Propiedad y Mercantiles de España, Madrid; The Insolvency Service, United States Courts. The data on insolvencies in the United Kingdom also include the sale 
of the whole business to third parties and, consequently, they overestimate the percentage of companies which are dismantled. 
c Year 2013. Source: Doing Business (World Bank).
d Year 2010. Sources: Eurostat, OECD, national sources and Euler Hermes (2011); "Economic Outlook 2011",  No. 4, Business Insolvency Worldwide, Evreux. 
1  This proceeding may also be used by individuals without a business 
activity (consumers), although this box focuses on firms.
2  Royal Decree-Law 3/2009 of 27 March 2009 on urgent tax, financial and 
insolvency measures in the face of economic developments.
3  Law 38/2011 of 10 October 2011 reforming Insolvency Law 22/2003 of 
9 July 2003.
4  Law 14/2013 of 27 September 2013 to support entrepreneurs and their 
internationalisation.
5  Royal Decree-Law 4/2014 of 7 March 2014, adopting urgent measures 
on corporate debt refinancing and restructuring.
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assets do not cover its liabilities usually result in a creditors’ race 
for the available funds. This may lead to the dismantling of a firm 
which is solvent but has liquidity problems and to losses for all 
creditors.
Insolvency proceedings in Spain attempt to overcome these 
problems through several arrangements. Generally, the beginning 
of the insolvency proceedings halts all enforcement proceedings 
against the firm. Additionally, a list is drawn up of all the company’s 
assets and the claims against it, so that all creditors have the same 
information about the company’s net worth position. Finally, for a 
creditors’ agreement to be approved the favourable vote of 
creditors representing at least 50% of the firm’s liabilities, which 
are not collateralised, is required.
However, in practice, several factors have prevented insolvency 
proceedings in Spain from carrying out their function satisfactorily. 
First, they last a very long time compared with similar proceedings 
in other developed countries, except for Italy, and have increased 
significantly since the beginning of the crisis (see Panel 1). Second, 
a very high proportion of firms which are subject to insolvency 
proceedings (95%) are ultimately wound up. Since it is unlikely 
that practically all the firms entering insolvency proceedings are 
non-viable, the system would seem to be incapable of restructuring 
the debt of solvent companies with liquidity problems. As for other 
developed countries, only Italy has a similar percentage, whereas 
the figures for France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
are substantially lower (see Panel 2). Finally, as shown by Panel 3, 
insolvency proceedings in Spain have high direct costs which 
consume a large share of the firm’s assets. These costs are higher 
than in the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and 
France, and only lower than those in Italy. These factors contribute 
to insolvency proceedings being used much less in Spain by firms 
under financial pressure than in most developed countries as 
shown by the insolvency rates (the number of companies 
commencing insolvency proceedings divided by those leaving the 
market), shown in Panel 4.
The need to have rapid and flexible proceedings in place is 
particularly important in the case of large and medium-sized firms 
where coordination problems can reduce the success of private 
negotiations owing to the large number of creditors involved. By 
contrast, private restructurings are more likely to work at small 
companies in view of the small number of lenders (35% of Spanish 
SMEs with bank debt use only one bank and 60% use one or more 
banks)6.
The reforms of the Insolvency Law implemented recently by the 
Entrepreneurs’ Law and Royal Decree-Law 4/2014, develop the 
alternatives to insolvency proceedings. The former creates a specific 
procedure – the out-of-court agreement for payment – for the self-
employed and small businesses, which habitually used insolvency 
proceedings least due to their high fixed costs. The latter introduces 
changes into how pre-insolvency refinancing works to make it more 
appealing and effective so that firms can restructure their debt more 
flexibly without having to apply for insolvency proceedings.
More specifically, Royal Decree-Law 4/2014 simplifies the 
proceedings required for undertaking such operations and for 
halting individual debt enforcement proceedings while negotiations 
take place. It extends the list of conditions of these agreements 
which can be imposed on dissident creditors. Thus, in addition to 
partial acquittances, provision is also made for the possibility of 
reductions in the payment period, the conversion of debt into 
equity and other financial instruments, and the transfer in payment 
of debt of the assets or claims of the company in difficulties. The 
mere capitalisation of debt by creditors does not make them 
persons specially related to the insolvent legal person. 
Consequently, they avoid the detrimental treatment (subordination 
of their loans) generally received by the claims of shareholders or 
partners of a firm subject to insolvency proceedings. The Royal 
Decree-Law also stipulates that temporarily during a period of two 
years from the entry into force of the law, any fresh financing 
(previously 50%) which has been extended in the framework of a 
refinancing agreement will be considered as a claim on the debtor’s 
assets, thus giving it a higher priority in the ranking of claims. 
Insofar as the agreements reached respond to a feasible plan 
permitting the continuity of the firm, the liabilities arising from the 
negotiations will, logically, have a lower risk of non-payment. In the 
particular case of bank creditors, restructured debts, providing that 
they comply with the strict criteria established, would be classified 
as standard exposure, as was clarified by the Banco de España’s 
communication to banks in March 2014. This would reduce the 
need to record provisions for them and would thus increase the 
capacity of banks to meet new solvent demand for lending.
BOX 2.2CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS (cont’d)
6  Source: Central Credit Register, May 2013.
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In recent years, the central banks of the main advanced economies 
have made increasingly frequent use of forward guidance, in order 
to steer agents’ expectations, against a background of official 
interest rates close to the zero lower bound and doubts over the 
marginal effectiveness and risks of non-standard quantitative 
measures.1
Although the use of this instrument has been increasing generally 
among these central banks, there are significant differences in the 
objectives pursued in each case. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) has insisted that the new tool does not involve any change 
in its monetary policy strategy; rather, the aim is to anchor interest 
rate expectations more effectively and, by reducing uncertainty, to 
increase the effectiveness of monetary policy2 (see main text). 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) has used 
forward guidance to indicate its intention to provide a prolonged 
stimulus to the economy and, more recently, to communicate the 
way in which it expects to normalise its policy in future. Some 
academics have argued for the use of this instrument to prompt a 
change in the central bank’s reaction function and to maintain a 
more expansionary monetary policy stance than would be 
consistent with a conventional Taylor rule, assigning greater 
relative weight to activity.3
These diverse objectives have translated into differences in the 
design and evolution of forward guidance measures (see Panel 1). 
Some central banks have decided to offer qualitative guidance 
with no specific time limit, indicating the maintenance of a 
particular monetary policy for a prolonged period (this is what 
the Fed did initially and what the ECB is currently doing). Other 
forms of forward guidance are more complex. For example, 
specific time periods may be set (as the Fed has done in recent 
years) or the guidance may be contingent, i.e. conditional upon 
quantitative thresholds for certain economic variables, such as 
the rate of unemployment (the Fed and the Bank of England), 
provided that this does not entail risks to price stability or 
financial stability. Finally, the Bank of Japan uses a special case 
of forward guidance that is contingent upon the achievement of 
an inflation target of 2%, that refers to the monetary base 
(which has replaced the official interest rate as the main 
instrument of monetary policy) and that has an open-ended time 
horizon. 
As regards the effectiveness of forward guidance measures, the 
analyses carried out to date conclude that their impact has been 
positive, reducing the volatility of money market interest rates 
and the uncertainty regarding the future monetary policy stance and 
improving general financial conditions (see Panel 2), albeit with 
weaker effects at longer time horizons. These findings should be 
treated with some caution, however, since it is generally difficult to 
separate the different factors and the anticipated effects. Moreover, 
forward guidance measures have not always succeeded in aligning 
market expectations with the central bank’s signalled intentions. 
Thus, while there seems to be evidence that the Fed’s announcements 
indicating a specific period managed to transmit to the markets a 
switch towards a more accommodating monetary policy, the 
experience with forms of forward guidance subject to numerical 
thresholds has been less favourable. In the case of the Bank of 
England, following the announcement of its strategy in August 2013, 
the markets expected the first official rate rise more than a year 
before the central bank’s own forecasts. The difficulties of designing 
and communicating contingent forward guidance have also been 
apparent in recent months in the abandonment of numerical 
thresholds by both the Fed and the Bank of England. This was a 
consequence of a much more rapid reduction in unemployment 
rates in these economies than was initially anticipated, without a 
similarly favourable evolution of the fundamentals of the economy 
(see Panel 3),4 which forced the central banks concerned to 
reintroduce qualitative elements, indicating that official rates would 
be held at current levels for a more or less prolonged period.
These communication problems illustrate the significant challenges 
facing forward guidance measures. The main issue is how to 
ensure the credibility of instruments that, by their very nature, 
pose more severe time-inconsistency problems than other tools. 
Additional effort is needed, when designing these measures, to 
ensure that the need to recalibrate or redefine them subsequently 
is minimised, and also when explaining them, since their 
effectiveness depends on correct interpretation by the public of 
the monetary authority’s message. A balance thus needs to be 
struck between transparency and clarity, since agents may be 
confused as much by a lack of information as by an excess of 
technical detail. These difficulties have been highlighted by recent 
experience with quantitative thresholds; they are especially severe 
when the measures are complicated to explain to the public or the 
projection of the reference variables is surrounded by a high 
degree of uncertainty or hinges on controversial factors.
Finally, although forward guidance measures have been useful in the 
context of the monetary policy response to the crisis, a relevant 
question for the future is whether they have a role to play in the 
BOX 3.1FORWARD GUIDANCE
1  The use of forward guidance is not new. For a review of the most recent 
experience of forward guidance, see for example, S. López and P. del 
Río (2013), “El uso de la orientación de expectativas o forward guidance 
como instrumento de política monetaria”, Boletín Económico, December, 
Banco de España; or A. Filardo and B. Hofmann (2014), “Forward 
guidance at the zero lower bound”, BIS Quarterly Review, March.
2  See P. Praet (2013), “Forward guidance and the ECB”, in W. den Haan 
(ed.), Forward guidance: Perspectives from central bankers, scholars and 
market participants, a voxEU.org eBook, CEPR; and B. Coeré (2013), 
“The usefulness of forward guidance”, speech delivered at the Money 
Marketeers Club of New York, New York, 26 September; and ECB (2014), 
Annual Report 2013.
3  See, for example, the recommendations in P. Krugman (1998) “It’s 
baaaack! Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap”, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, No 2; and M. Woodford (2012), “Methods 
of policy accommodation at the interest-rate lower bound”, Jackson 
Hole Economic Symposium Conference Proceedings, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, pp. 185-288. 
4  An analysis of the difficulty inherent in this type of tools, in the context of 
the recent problems that the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of 
England have had, can be found in the article “The world economy faced 
with a change in scenario. Developments, outlook and risks”, Economic 
Bulletin, March 2014, Banco de España.
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process of withdrawal of monetary stimuli. In general, it might be 
considered that, as the economy recovers, they should play a key 
role in the communication of exit strategies, by steering agents’ 
expectations. However, when the situation returns to normal, the 
question of whether these measures should form part of the standard 
set of monetary policy instruments will need to be analysed. 
BOX 3.1FORWARD GUIDANCE (cont’d)
Central bank
Type of forward 
guidance
Date of decision Announcement
Contingent February 2012 "Until the 1% inkation goal is in sight"
Contingent April 2013
"The Bank will continue with the quantitative and qualitative 
monetary easing, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2 
percent, as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a 
stable manner, with a time horizon of about two years"
Open-ended December 2008 "For some time"
Open-ended March 2009 "For an extended period"
Fixed period August 2011 "At least through mid-2013"
Fixed period January 2012 "At least through late 2014"
Fixed period September 2012 "At least through mid-2015"
Contingent December 2012
"As long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5%, inkation 
between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more 
than 2.5% and longer-term inkation expectations continue to be 
well anchored"
Contingent, with  
greater qualitative 
assessment
December 2013
“Additional measures of labour market conditions will be 
considered and it likely will be appropiate to maintain the current 
target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the 
unemployment rate declines below 6.5%, especially if projected 
Contingent, with 
qualitative assessment
March 2014
"In determining how long to maintain the current 0% - 0.25% 
target range for the federal funds rate, measures of labour 
market conditions, indicators of inkation pressures and inkation 
expectations and jnancial developments will be taken in to 
account"
Contingent August 2013
"At least until the unemployment rate has fallen to a threshold of 
7%, subject to three 'knockouts' related to inkation and jnancial 
stability"
Contingent, with greater
qualitative assessment
February 2014
"There remains scope to absorb spare capacity further before 
raising Bank Rate. The path of Bank Rate over the next few 
years will depend on economic developments, although the rise 
in Bank Rate is expected to be gradual and the appropriate level 
is likely to be materially below 5%"
Open-ended July 2013
"For an extended period of time. This expectation is based on the 
overall subdued outlook for inkation extending into the medium 
term, given the broad-based weakness in the real economy and 
subdued monetary dynamics"
Bank of Canada Fixed period April 2009
"Until the end of the second quarter of 2010, conditional on the 
inkation outlook"
Sveriges Riksbank Fixed period April 2009 "Until the beginning of 2011"
Bank of Japan
Bank of England
European 
Central Bank
Federal Reserve 
System
1 FORWARD GUIDANCE BY THE MAIN CENTRAL BANKS FOLLOWING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve System, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Bank of Canada and Sveriges Riksbank. 
NOTE: Conditingent: conditional upon economic variables. 
inkation continues to run below the 2% goal”
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BOX 3.1FORWARD GUIDANCE (cont’d)
Qualitative
European Central 
Bank
System System System System
Federal 
Reserve 
Federal 
Reserve 
Federal 
Reserve 
Federal 
Reserve Bank of Japan
Bank of 
England
4.7.2013 9.8.2011 25.1.2012 13.9.2012 12.12.2012 4.4.2013 7.8.2013
Treasury bond (a)
Two-year -6 -7 -1 -1 0 0 1
Ten-year -3 -16 -6 -1 5 -11 0
Volatility (VIX) (a)
VIX 0.0 -12.9 -0.6 -1.8 0.4 -0.3 0.3
Market index (b) (%)
S&P 500 0.0 4.7 0.9 1.6 0.0 0.4 -0.4
EUROSTOXX 2.9 0.3 -0.5 -0.8 0.2 -0.7 0.1
FTSE 3.1 1.9 -0.5 0.7 0.4 -1.2 -1.4
NIKKEI -0.3 -1.7 1.1 0.4 0.6 2.2 -4.0
MSCI - Global 0.6 2.1 0.5 0.9 0.2 -0.3 -0.6
Dollar-euro 0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.2
Yen-dollar 0.0 -0.6 0.1 -0.3 0.7 3.5 -1.1
Sterling-dollar 1.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.9
Exchange rates (b) (c) (%)
Types of forward guidance
Calendar Conditional on economic variables
2  FINANCIAL MARKET RESPONSE TO FORWARD GUIDANCE ANNOUNCEMENTS          
SOURCES: Bloomberg and Datastream-Thomsom Reuters. 
a One-day change, in basis points. 
b One-day percentage change. 
c Minus sign denotes depreciation of the second currency. 
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BOX 3.2BANK LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE EURO AREA
Bank loans are the main source of private-sector financing in the 
euro area and, consequently, their availability is pivotal in 
supporting economic recovery. The markedly cyclical nature of 
loans is determined by the combination of demand and supply 
factors which operate in the same direction over the economic 
cycle and, consequently, are difficult to separate. For non-financial 
corporations this cyclical pattern has shown historically a slight 
lag with respect to GDP.
Even taking into account these regularities, loans have been 
weak since mid-2012, out of kilter with the more stable 
economic activity. This suggests the presence of additional 
factors that would seem to be restraining their growth (see 
Panels 1 and 2).
On the demand side, a prime candidate for explaining this 
behaviour is the high private-sector debt in certain countries 
and the need to decrease it. As shown by Panels 3 and 4, this 
situation is evident in the highly negative net flows of bank 
loans in countries where private debt rose substantially before 
the crisis – mainly in Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain. The 
debt levels are being addressed in a setting of low economic 
growth and moderate inflation, which means that deleveraging 
has to take place essentially through net negative financing 
flows. In the Spanish case there is empirical evidence that 
corroborates the negative effect of debt levels on bank loans to 
non-financial corporations (see, for example, Box 4.1 of this 
report).
On the supply side, the capital and liquidity position of banks 
essentially determines the strength with which the cyclical 
position feeds through to credit [Jiménez et al. (2012)]1. Although 
the solvency of banks is not isolated from the economic 
situation, which has had a negative impact on the quality of the 
assets in their portfolios, the effects on lending may be 
intensified on this occasion by the fact that, as a result of the 
global financial crisis, both markets and new regulatory 
frameworks demand more stringent prudential standards. There 
is also empirical evidence which supports the importance of 
supply factors for credit during the last crisis both for the area as 
a whole [Darracq Paries et al. (2014)]2 and for core countries 
such as Germany [Blaes (2011)]3.
During the most recent period, the indirect information of the Bank 
Lending Survey indicates that during 2013 both demand and 
supply factors have been important. Within supply factors, the 
perception of credit risk has been the main determining factor of 
the restrictive bias in supply conditions, although the banks have 
also stated that the regulatory changes have affected credit 
standards and prompted an adjustment of their loan portfolios – 
particularly those with the highest risk – (see Panel 5).
It is also interesting to note that among the larger corporations there 
is some substitution of external sources of financing as a result of the 
expansionary monetary policy stance which seems to have passed 
through more strongly into the debt markets than into the cost of 
new loans. Since 2009 fixed-income issues have represented more 
than 4% of GDP in cumulative terms, compared with a fall in bank 
loans of almost 2% of GDP. Issuance was more vigorous in countries 
where firms started from a more market-oriented structure of 
liabilities (see Panel 6). In the economies subject to greater stress 
during the crisis, the problems of financial fragmentation within the 
area raised the funding costs of the banks themselves and, 
consequently, the costs of the loans that they could extend.
In short, the recent sluggishness of bank loans is a reason for 
concern insofar as it seems to respond, aside from cyclical factors, 
to the presence of factors restricting both demand and supply. The 
effect of such factors is quite mixed from country to country. In a 
setting in which banks are immersed in a process of adapting to the 
new regulatory and market standards, successfully completing this 
adaptation may be crucial so that credit supply does not limit 
investment or the economic recovery. From a different standpoint, 
the crisis has also underlined the risks which arise from companies 
limiting the diversification of their sources of financing. The risks 
are more pronounced for SMEs, it is particularly complex for them 
to gain access to markets because of restrictions due to their size 
and ability to produce relevant information for investors. Such risks 
justify the study of initiatives specifically targeted at this sector.
1  G. Jiménez, S. Ongena, J.L. Peydró and J. Saurina (2012), “Credit 
supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet 
Channel with Loan Applications”, American Economic Review, 102 (5), 
pp. 2301-2326.
2  M. Darracq Paries, L. Maurín and D. Moccero (2014), Financial Condition 
Index and Credit Supply Shocks for the Euro Area, Working Paper No. 
1644, March, European Central bank. 
3  B. Blaes (2011), Bank-related loan supply factors during the crisis: an 
analysis based on the German bank lending survey, Discussion Paper, 
No. 31/2011, Deutsche Bundesbank.
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BOX 3.2BANK LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
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Since its mid-2009 peak, aggregate debt in the corporate sector 
has progressively declined. However, this aggregate contraction 
encompasses very mixed individual behaviours. As can be seen 
in Panel 1, the decline in the aggregate outstanding balance of 
corporations’ bank lending (which is their main source of 
financing, especially in the case of the smaller firms) has occurred 
alongside sizeable positive financing flows towards certain 
corporations. The increase in loans extended to the latter has 
BOX 4.1A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANK LENDING TO NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Calculations made with information from the Central Credit Register.
b Average of the related sectoral results.
c Calculations made with cross-checked information from the Central Credit Register and the Central Balance Sheet Data Ofjce.  
d Average of the year-on-year growth rate of employment in each sector. 
e Debt burden dejned as jnancial charges/(Gross Operating Projt + Financial Revenue).
f Results obtained on estimating a linear probability model with jxed effects. 
g Ratio of credit received from banks undergoing restructuring to the corporation's total volume of loans. 
Coefjcient P-value
Projtability (t-1) 0.0238 0.000
Debt burden (t-1) (e) -0.0080 0.000
Indebtedness (t-1) -0.1529 0.000
Growth rate of employment (t-1) 0.0043 0.004
Growth rate of sectoral employment (t-1) 0.0034 0.064
Level of dependence on banks undergoing restructuring (t-1) (g) -0.0293 0.000
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logically been lower than that recorded pre-crisis (in line with the 
more unfavourable economic setting and the stricter credit 
standards in force), but it has held at considerable volumes 
(between 6.8% and 13% of GDP over this period). As a 
counterpoint to this, for companies with negative credit flows, 
deleveraging has come about at an appreciably greater pace than 
what the aggregate figure suggests. 
In terms of the number of firms, from 2008 to 2012 the percentage 
of companies recording an increase (or stability) in their bank 
financing fell progressively, but held constantly at significant levels 
for almost all the sectors of activity and for both SMEs and bigger 
corporations (see Panel 2).1 This declining trend was interrupted in 
2013, with the proportion of companies with a net positive or zero 
credit flow rising slightly (up by 1 pp to 39%). The change affected 
all sectors of activity and both large corporations and, especially, 
SMEs.2 This was accompanied by a stabilisation of credit flows, 
following the declining trend in train since 2006. 
Panels 3 and 4 compare the one-period-lagged3 average values of 
two characteristics of significance from an economic and financial 
standpoint, distinguishing between companies on the basis of 
whether they received more bank credit or not: the debt burden 
(which combines information on the level of debt, interest rates 
paid and income generated) and employment. These panels infer 
that companies at which outstanding loan balances fell showed, 
on average, in the previous year, lower debt servicing ratios and a 
more lacklustre performance in terms of staffing4.
For a more in-depth analysis of the variables that are most 
significant when it comes to explaining whether a company 
increases its level of credit or not, a simple model has been 
estimated in which this binary variable is related to a series of 
potential determinants. These include both the sector in which the 
company is operating and the dynamism of this productive sector 
as individual characteristics of the companies such as its debt, 
debt burden and profitability (measured as a proportion of assets), 
or the growth rate of its staff (which proxies the dynamism of its 
activity). Also included is a variable that captures the degree of 
dependence on banks undergoing restructuring, defined as the 
ratio of credit received from these banks and the total volume of 
the company’s bank loans. 
As is seen in the accompanying table, the results show that the 
relevant variables (i.e. those that are statistically significant) 
when it comes to determining whether a company increases its 
level of credit are its profitability, its indebtedness level and debt 
burden, the rate at which its staff numbers are increasing and 
that of the sector in which it is operating, and its dependence on 
banks undergoing restructuring.5 Results are as expected: the 
greater dynamism of the company’s activity or of the sector in 
which it operates translates into a higher probability of the 
company increasing its volume of loans. Conversely, greater 
financial pressure (whether that resulting from higher debt, from 
lower profitability or from a higher proportion of income 
generated being absorbed by financial expenses) lessens this 
probability.6 The degree of dependence on banks subject to 
restructuring plans also has a contractionary influence on this 
probability, showing that companies linked to these banks 
would not have been able to fully replace the funds they ceased 
to receive from their habitual lenders with financing from other 
sounder banks.7
BOX 4.1A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANK LENDING TO NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS (cont’d)
1  These proportions have been lower in the case of smaller firms, where 
the impact of the economic crisis has been greater, than for large 
corporations, where the figure stood at 46%, on average, between 2008 
and 2013. 
2  The smaller rise in the first case is probably linked to the replacement of 
financing from resident banks with other sources, such as securities 
issuance or foreign loans .
3  The one-period-lagged values are offered to correct the potential 
problems of endogeneity. In the case of employment, the average is 
given, and in that of the debt burden, the median. 
4  Although not shown in the panels, they were also less profitable and had 
higher debt ratios. 
5  All the variables are one-period-lagged in order to correct the potential 
problems of endogeneity. The ratios are all significant with a confidence 
level of 95%, except that associated with the growth rate of sectoral 
employment, which is significant with a confidence level of 90%. 
6  When the non-performing loans ratio is introduced into the model, it 
proves significant, although its quantitative impact is very low: a 10 pp 
increase in this variable translates into a 0.008 pp rise in the probability 
that the company will increase its credit. 
7  It was estimated in Box 6.1 in the 2012 Annual Report that, on average, 
dependent companies might replace around 65% of the financing they 
ceased to receive from these banks. Subsequent updates confirm the 
validity of the estimate in the case of the so-called Group 1 banks (those 
in which the FROB already had a stake at the time of the stress test). The 
contractionary impact of the restructuring plans on the growth rate of 
the dependent companies’ financing is estimated at somewhat less than 
2 pp in 2013. Given that the Group 1 banks were channelling 12% of 
non-financial corporations’ total credit at the start of this year, the 
influence of these plans on the rate of decline of the overall sector’s 
credit would be around 0.2 pp.
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The economic and financial crisis has led to a substantial increase 
in the general government debt of the OECD countries, to levels 
that represent 25-year highs, well above those in the period 
immediately preceding 2008 (see Panel 1). This growth in debt, 
and the difficulty of bringing it to a halt, has placed the sustainability 
of public finances at the centre of the economic policy debate in 
Europe. In the particular case of Spain, despite the fiscal 
adjustment implemented since 2010, the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
has carried on rising, since the start of the crisis, reaching 93.9% 
of GDP in 2013. According to the latest government forecasts 
(2014-2017 Stability Programme), in a scenario of compliance with 
deficit commitments and moderate economic growth (average real 
GDP growth of 2.1% over the period 2014-2017) the public debt-
to-GDP ratio will stabilise in 2015 at slightly above 100% (see 
Chart 1), a level without precedent in Spain’s recent past, and well 
above the peak reached in the crisis of the 1990s, when it remained 
below 70% of GDP.
The international evidence available suggests that the existence of 
high levels of public debt for prolonged periods may have 
significant macroeconomic repercussions.1 First, high levels of 
debt are usually associated with higher interest rates (see Panel 2) 
and, potentially, owing to the impact of these on investment and 
the crowding-out of funding for the private sector, lower medium-
term GDP growth rates. However, the latest evidence suggests 
that it is not possible to associate these negative effects on growth 
with a particular threshold of public debt, which may vary from 
country to country, and that the dynamics of debt may be as 
important as the level when explaining the effects on growth.2 
Second, high public debt reduces the leeway for a counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, which may be very necessary in countries that belong 
to a monetary union. Indeed, there is evidence associating high 
levels of public debt with greater volatility of economic growth, 
which could be a consequence of this lack of fiscal policy leeway. 
In addition, the sustainability of a high level of public debt, in an 
environment of weak or moderate growth, requires large and 
sustained primary surpluses, which may affect the composition of 
public finances and, ultimately, the potential growth of the 
economy if, for example, fiscal policy involves levels of taxation 
that are less conducive to growth or lower levels of productive 
spending. Finally, a high public debt ratio generates larger 
borrowing requirements in the short term, which increase the 
economy’s vulnerability to adverse financial market reactions.
The international evidence available on episodes of reduction of 
high levels of debt in advanced economies since the 1980s shows 
that the most effective were those associated with high GDP 
growth rates and large and sustained primary surpluses (see 
Panel  3). In comparison, other determinants of the dynamics of 
public debt, such as inflation, the fall in interest rates and deficit/
debt adjustments (reflected, for example, in aggressive privatisation 
processes or financial asset sales), played a secondary role. On the 
other hand, the slowest debt reduction processes have usually 
been constrained by the need for very large fiscal adjustments and 
BOX 4.2THE SPANISH ECONOMY IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH PUBLIC DEBT: ECONOMIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
AND IMPLICATIONS
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a The year of the highest level of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio over the period 1990-2006 is shown for each country. 
b The values for 2014-2017 are the ofjcial forecasts of the Kingdom of Spain's Stability Programme 2014-2017, submitted in April 2014.
1  See, for example, S. A. Abbas, B. Akitoby, J. Andritzky, H. Berger, 
T. Komatsuzaki and J. Tyson (2013), “Dealing with high debt in an era of 
low growth”, IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/13/07; C. Checherita-
Westphal and P. Rother (2012), “The impact of high government debt on 
economic growth and its channels: An empirical investigation for the 
euro area”, European Economic Review, 56, pp. 1392-1405.
2  See A. Pescatori, D. Sandri and J. Simon (2014), “Debt and Growth: Is 
There a Magic Threshold?”, IMF Working Paper, No 14/34.
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macroeconomic environments characterised by low economic 
growth and high interest rates.
In the case of Spain, the process of public debt reduction is 
constrained, in the short term, by the need for private-sector 
deleveraging and by the process of fiscal consolidation itself and, 
in the medium term, by the effect of an ageing population. The 
medium-term outlook of moderate economic growth and inflation 
will make the task of reducing public debt difficult and will require 
significant fiscal surpluses to be achieved and sustained. The 
importance of these constraints can be seen from the following 
simulation: in a scenario with real GDP growth of 1%, inflation of 
1.5% and an implied nominal interest rate of 3.5% (similar to the 
level observed in 2013), the primary surplus necessary to stabilise 
public debt at 100% of GDP would be 1% of GDP,3 as compared 
with an actual primary deficit in 2013 of 3.2% of GDP.
The current macroeconomic situation is very different from that 
which prevailed when public debt was reduced between 1996 and 
2007. Comparing the determinants of the change in the public debt-
to-GDP ratio during the current fiscal consolidation process that 
began in 2009, when the budget deficit reached 11.1% of GDP, with 
BOX 4.2THE SPANISH ECONOMY IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH PUBLIC DEBT: ECONOMIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
AND IMPLICATIONS (cont’d)
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3  In the case of Spain, since the 1980s consecutive primary surpluses 
have only been recorded between 1987 and 1990 (on average 0.5% of 
GDP) and between 1997 and 2007 (on average 2.4% of GDP), in the 
latter case against a background of strong economic growth and easing 
financial conditions.
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those lying behind the last fiscal consolidation process, between 
1998, when the budget deficit resulting from the 1990s crisis peaked 
(at 7.5% of GDP), and the end of the decade, reveals a fundamental 
difference. Although the reduction in the deficit over the first four 
years of each episode was similar – some four percentage points of 
GDP – during the last fiscal consolidation process this adjustment 
was sufficient to stabilise and slightly reduce the debt ratio, while in 
the current situation debt has continued to grow.
The main explanation for this significant difference is the 
contribution of nominal GDP growth. Between 1994 and 1997 
GDP growth enabled the public debt ratio to be reduced by some 
17 percentage points, while between 2010 and 2013 the negative 
behaviour of GDP increased the public debt ratio by some two 
GDP percentage points.
In short, high levels of public debt have significant adverse 
effects, which mean that the first priority of fiscal policy must be 
stabilisation, and thereafter a gradual reduction in the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio towards low levels. The Spanish economy’s 
medium-term macroeconomic scenario suggests that debt 
reduction will require a prolonged sizeable fiscal adjustment. This 
must be anchored in a credible medium-term strategy that 
enables agents’ expectations to be stabilised and long-term 
interest rates to be kept low. Strict compliance with the current 
framework of national and European fiscal rules is fundamental 
for this purpose. It is also important that this process be 
accompanied by further structural reforms that make an 
improvement in the medium-term economic growth outlook 
possible, permitting the latter to make a greater contribution to 
the process of public-sector deleveraging.
BOX 4.2THE SPANISH ECONOMY IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH PUBLIC DEBT: ECONOMIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
AND IMPLICATIONS (cont’d)
